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How	the	rise	of	the	Swedish	radical	right	changed	the
most	stable	party	system	in	Europe
The	Swedish	party	system	has	long	been	regarded	as	one	of	the	most	stable	in	Western
Europe.	However,	as	Nicholas	Aylott	and	Niklas	Bolin	write,	the	growth	in	support	for
the	radical	right	Sweden	Democrats	ahead	of	the	Swedish	general	election	on	9
September	represents	a	major	challenge	to	the	country’s	two	traditional	political	blocs.
While	the	SD	may	not	end	up	in	government	any	time	soon,	it	will	be	increasingly	difficult	in
the	long-term	for	the	mainstream	parties	to	maintain	their	‘cordon	sanitaire’	around	the
party.
On	9	September	Swedish	voters	head	to	the	polls.	So	far,	no	single	political	issue	has	dominated	the	campaign.
Rather,	voters	might	be	wondering	most	about	what	happens	after	election	day.	Government	formation	used	to	be	a
fairly	straightforward	and	simple	process,	but	most	pundits	expect	post-election	negotiations	this	time	to	be	extremely
difficult.	So	what	has	happened?	The	simple	answer	is	that	everything	changed	with	the	surge	of	the	radical	right.
For	a	long	time,	the	Swedish	party	system	was	arguably	one	of	the	most	stable	in	Western	Europe.	The	Swedish
parliament,	the	Riksdag,	harboured	the	exact	same	five	parties	for	more	than	60	years,	from	the	democratic
breakthrough	in	the	1920s	until	the	late	1980s.	While	the	five-party	model	became	outdated	in	the	last	two	decades
of	the	20th	century,	the	dynamics	of	party	competition	remained	much	the	same.	Politics	was	dominated	by	two
political	blocs.	New	parties	did	not	change	this.
The	Greens,	who	arrived	in	1988,	although	stubbornly	insisting	that	they	were	neither	left	nor	right,	increasingly	came
to	be	regarded	as	an	important	part	of	the	centre-left	bloc	led	by	the	Social	Democrats.	The	Christian	Democrats,
who	entered	the	Riksdag	in	1991,	became	affiliated	with	the	centre-right	bloc.	In	the	early	21st	century,	bloc	politics
were	cemented	even	further	when	the	centre-right	bloc	became	a	pre-electoral	coalition,	the	‘Alliance	for	Sweden’,
led	by	the	liberal-conservative	Moderates.	The	centre-left	quickly	followed	suit	and	formed	the	‘Red-Greens’.	The
formalisation	of	bloc	politics	went	so	far	that	we	once	speculated	about	whether	Swedish	politics	had	in	effect	turned
into	a	two-party	system.	Soon,	however,	the	significance	of	the	traditional	blocs	was	to	be	severely	challenged.
The	reason	for	this	is	the	unparalleled	electoral	surge	of	the	radical	right	party	the	Sweden	Democrats	(SD).	Formed
in	the	late	1980s	by	outright	extremist	groups,	the	electoral	development	of	the	party	has	been	remarkable.	The	SD
has	increased	its	vote	share	in	each	election	since;	indeed,	that	share	has	more	or	less	doubled	every	time.	It	first
entered	the	Riksdag	in	2010	and	became	the	third-biggest	party	in	2014,	when	it	won	about	13	per	cent	of	the	vote.
There	are	several	reasons	for	the	sudden	rise	of	the	SD.	One	is	the	convergence	of	mainstream	parties’	stances	on
immigration	policy,	which	opened	a	space	for	an	immigration-sceptical	party.	Another	is	the	way	that	the	SD
leadership	skilfully	rebranded	the	party	and	developed	its	organisation.	In	the	upcoming	election,	the	SD	will	continue
its	growth.	Anything	but	a	major	increase	in	support	will	be	a	big	disappointment	for	it.	Most	opinion	polls	give	the	SD
somewhere	between	18	and	22	per	cent	of	the	vote.
The	rise	of	the	SD	has	had	a	profound	impact	on	Swedish	politics,	and	the	party’s	weakening	of	the	traditional	blocs
has	been	arguably	its	most	important	effect.	The	Alliance	parties,	at	least,	still	argue	that	their	co-operation	endures
and	that	their	goal	is	to	govern	in	coalition	together.	The	big	problem	is	that	the	maths	simply	don’t	add	up.	Neither	of
the	blocs	is	anywhere	near	to	winning	its	own	majority.	Just	as	problematic	is	the	fact	that	the	rise	of	the	SD	has
taken	place	in	parallel	with	the	rise	of	alternative	political	issues.	Most	importantly,	immigration,	which	used	to	be	a
second-order	issue	in	Swedish	politics,	is	now	one	of	the	voters’	main	priorities.	What	is	more,	this	issue	has	cut	right
through	the	blocs.	In	other	words,	the	rise	of	the	SD	has	not	only	undermined	the	scope	for	the	traditional	blocs	to
win	parliamentary	majorities.	It	has	also	exposed	important	intra-bloc	differences.
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In	order	to	create	a	majority	after	the	election,	only	two	options	are	available.	The	first	is	to	go	for	some	sort	of	cross-
bloc	co-operation.	The	other	is	for	some	party	or	parties	to	co-operate	with	the	SD.	Given	that	all	parties	have
hitherto	refused	to	deal	in	any	way	with	the	SD,	it	seems	as	if	a	cross-bloc	agreement	of	some	sort	is	on	the	cards.
However,	it	is	not	at	all	obvious	what	a	government	that	rests	on	such	an	agreement	would	look	like.	Given	the
improbability	that	the	other	flank	party,	the	Left	Party,	will	be	invited	to	take	part,	few	combinations	with	majority
potential	remain.	One	way	out	might	be	a	very	narrow	minority	government,	not	exactly	supported	by	other
mainstream	parties,	but	at	least	tolerated	by	them.	It	is	even	possible	that	the	main	adversaries	over	the	last	four
decades,	the	Social	Democrats	and	the	Moderates,	could	govern	together.
And	even	if	a	majority	of	some	kind	can	be	achieved,	the	temptation	to	enlist	the	support	of	the	SD	will	remain	as
long	as	the	party	stays	as	big	as	it	is.	In	fact,	while	the	leaders	of	the	established	parties	still	uphold	a	cordon
sanitaire	around	the	SD,	local	politicians	have	aired	their	willingness	to	deal	with	the	party.	In	a	recent	poll,	less	than
a	third	of	the	Moderates’	local	councillors	stated	that	they	ruled	out	cooperation	with	the	SD.
This	does	not	mean	the	SD	will	end	up	in	government	any	time	soon.	However,	the	cordon	sanitaire	is	starting	to
fray.	The	SD	leadership,	with	increasing	confidence,	has	launched	the	idea	of	a	new	conservative	bloc	that	includes,
besides	the	SD,	the	Moderates	and	the	Christian	Democrats.	It	is	unlikely	that	this	dream	will	materialise	in	the	near
future.	In	the	long	run,	though,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	all	the	established	parties	can	resist	the	potential	perks
associated	with	allying	with	the	SD.	As	we	also	know,	political	realities	change	rapidly.	What	seemed	completely
impossible	just	a	couple	of	years	ago	now	seems	more	and	more	like	a	matter	of	time.
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Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
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